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SHOULD THE CURRENT
TAX-TRANSFER SYSTEM
BE REPLACED BY
A FLAT-RATE INCOME TAX?*
By BERNARD FORTIN**
There has been growing interest in Canada in some form of
integration of personal income taxes and transfers. These
preoccupations are relatively recent, however. Thus, the 1966 Carter
Commission Report paid only cursory attention to the question of an
integrated tax-transfer system. One reference to this problem is in
volume 2, where it is recommended that "the federal government,
with the participation of the provincial governments, make a full and
careful evaluation of the present transfer system ... which should
take into account both the numerous suggestions that are now
current for 'negative income taxes' and 'cash tax allowance'. ''
The Commission's indifference to this problem is under-
standable since the Canadian social security system was still in its
infancy in 1966. Major expansions of transfer programs were
undertaken between 1966 and 1975 with the introduction of the
Canada Assistance Plan, the Guaranteed Income Supplement, and
the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, and with the major reforms
of Unemployment Insurance and the federal Family Allowances.
However, these important transfer programs were introduced
over the past twenty years with little co-ordination among themselves
o Copyright, 1988, Bernard Fortin.
**Department of Economics, Laval University.
lCanada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair. K. LeM. Carter) at 263.
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and with the personal tax system. For example, each provincial
income-tested program has its own levels of exemptions, guaranteed
income levels, implicit tax rate schedule, payment and accounting
periods, definition of taxable income and so on, often with limited
integration with the rest of the system.
Nonetheless, each of the many programs that make up the
system has its own justifiable rationale. Thus, for many observers,
the complexity simply reflects a multipurpose system that must serve
a variety of clientele. This argument's flaw is that each component
often interacts strongly with the others so that the whole system can
have different results from those intended by its constituent parts.
One of the contributions of the recent government of
Quebec White Paper on the Personal Tax and Transfer System 2 was
an emphasis on the entire tax-transfer system. The diagnosis posed
by the White Paper, the Macdonald Report and other recent
documents is clear: The lack of integration has created a system
that is often illogical and costly to administer. Moreover, it is the
source of serious problems, both of equity and of behavioural
incentives.
One major manifestation of this lack of system integration
concerns the presence of high effective marginal tax rates on pre-
transfer income faced by many low-income households. As is well
known, income-tested transfer programs give rise to the presence of
so-called implicit marginal tax rates. These marginal rates measure
the percentage reduction of transfer benefits associated with an
increase in pre-transfer income. While implicit taxes appear
nowhere in government accounts, their effect is the same as explicit
taxes. Over time, with the expansion of income-tested programs, the
importance of implicit taxes has sharply increased. My colleague
Henri-Paul Rousseau and 13 have estimated that they represent more
than 25 percent of all taxes in Quebec.
2 Quebec, Ministre des finances, White Paper on the Personal Tax and Transfcr System
(Quebec: Govt. of Quebec, 1984).
3 B. Fortin & H.-P. Rousseau, "The Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxes and Transfers in a
Small Open Economy- A Multihousehold Applied General Equilibrium Approach," Research
Paper No. 8612 (Quebec: Laval University, 1986).
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Most provinces have several welfare programs that are often
poorly integrated. Many low-income households receive benefits
from more than one program, yet they often pay income and payroll
taxes. The result is high implicit-cum-explicit marginal tax rates on
their gross income that sometimes exceed 100 percent.
Figures 1 to 4 depict, for selected representative households,
both in Quebec and Ontario, the explicit-cum-implicit marginal taxes
on labour earnings.
These schedules take into account the employees' payroll
taxes and the personal income tax, as well as the implicit taxes
associated with the most important assistance, supplementation, and
demogrant programs for each province. Note, however, that they
exclude the complex structure of implicit wage subsidies and taxes
associated with Unemployment Insurance expenditures. Thus, recent
analyses from documents like the Macdonald or Forget Reports have
emphasized that many features of the present Unemployment
Insurance (u1) system (such as regional benefits) reflect income
supplementation rather than strict income insurance. Of course, this
raises the problem of integration between social insurance and the
rest of the system. In the Figures, it is assumed that representative
individuals do not receive ui benefits.
As these Figures illustrate, after a low-level exemption, the
effective marginal tax rates are generally quite high at low-income
levels (often between 70 and 100 percent. As income increases,
individuals become ineligible for income-tested programs, and
marginal rates tend to fall before climbing back gradually with the
progressive income tax. Lack of integration in the tax-transfer
system is also reflected by the capricious and erratic behaviour of the
curves, especially for incomes below $15,000.
High effective tax rates often mean that the working poor
are left with a disposable income comparable to the one granted to
the able-bodied non-working poor in the same demographic category.
This causes serious equity problems and may generate social
antagonism between both groups of individuals.
Moreover, high implicit tax rates are likely to be the source
of important adverse effects on low-income household behaviour.
First, the system strongly discourages the return to work and
financial self-sufficiency. As a consequence, this situation creates a
poverty trap that condemns many social assistance recipients to
1988]
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permanent poverty. Moreover, it lowers the standard of living for
society as a whole because of wasted human resources.
One solution adopted by a number of welfare recipients to
get out of this poverty trap is to work in the hidden labour market.
The return on this activity increases with the level of the effective
tax rate. Thus, when the latter is 80 percent, the return on
undeclared working activities is five times its equivalent in the legal
labour market. In a recent survey, by my colleague Pierre Fr6chette
and me4 pertaining to tax evasion in the Quebec City Region, more
than one-third of social assistance claimants interviewed reported
having performed undeclared activities during the preceding year.
Finally, since the basic unit for transfer purposes is usually
the family, high implicit tax rates may encourage the break up of
families (especially when one spouse earns an income exceeding the
break-even point of transfer programs), and it may stimulate the
growth of single-parent families relying on social welfare. In
Quebec, the number of single-parent families has increased by more
than 60 percent in the past six years, and three-quarters of such
families, where the head is under thirty, receive social assistance.
Thus, the current system has been accused by many observers of
contributing to the very problems it was intended to solve.
The adoption of a comprehensive negative income tax (NIT)
scheme has often been advocated to provide full integration of the
tax-transfer systems. One approach for merging negative and
positive income taxes is a "mutual exclusion" system. This approach
sets the level of exemption in the positive tax equal to the no-
transfer threshold level of income in the NIT. Therefore no taxpayer
would receive a transfer and no transfer recipient would pay a
positive income tax. This approach was basically that retained in
the Quebec White Paper.
A more complex approach adopted in other proposals to
integrate the negative and positive income taxes is an "overlapping
system." This approach sets the levels of exemption below the no-
transfer threshold, but extends the NIT marginal tax rate above the
threshold level of income until it intersects the positive tax schedule.
4B. Fortin & P. Frfchette, "Premiers rdsultats de I'Enqudte sur les incidences et les
perceptions de la fiscalitd dans Ia r6gion de Qu6bec," Cahier d'Amdnagement du territoire et
de ddveloppement rdgional 8702" (Qu6bec: Universit6 Laval, 1987).
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In principle, these selective schemes could also be delivered with the
use of an equivalent universal payments system defined by similar
guaranteed income levels and similar marginal income tax rate
schedules, or by a hybrid of selective and universal programs. These
approaches indicate well that the apparent distinction between
selective and universal systems is much less relevant when taxes and
transfers are considered in an over-all system.
Any Nrr proposal has to be defined by three basic sets of
parameters: first, the categories of households eligible for NIT;
second, the minimum guaranteed level of income for each of these
categories; and third, the set of effective marginal tax rates. There
are obvious trade-offs between these parameters, which reflect the
more basic trade-offs between vertical equity, horizontal equity, and
economic efficiency. Therefore, the choice of these parameters
critically depends on value judgments about which analysts, as
analysts, have little to say.
Analysts, of course, can contribute to the debate by assessing
the severity of the equity-efficiency trade-off implied in the various
proposals. As an illustration of this, we will discuss one of the most
simple and revolutionary reforms proposed to integrate the tax-
transfer system: the introduction of a flat-rate negative income tax
in replacement of the current patchwork system.
This sweeping reform has been advocated many times since
it was first proposed by Lady Rhys Williams in Britain in 1943. A
flat-rate NIT system would extend proposals for a uniform-rate
positive income tax system, which has been popular recently in the
United States, to the negative income tax system. As in most flat-
rate proposals, it would, however, broaden the tax base by using a
more comprehensive definition of taxable income. The basic
characteristics of such a reform are that:
1. It would be progressive in the average sense: The average tax
rate, the ratio of the total tax payments to the individual's
income, would increase with income. Contrary to flat-rate
positive income tax proposals, this reform would likely favour the
working poor.
2. Since there would be only one marginal tax rate, this system
would necessarily be of the "mutual exclusion" form, which would
facilitate integration between the positive and negative tax
systems.
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3. A uniform tax rate and a broadened tax base would eliminate
many of the tax avoidance schemes currently used. Thus,
perverse effects on family structure would disappear.
4. It would simplify the administrative complexity of the present
system. Thus, tax averaging problems would be eliminated and
integration between corporate and personal income taxes would
be eased. The system would also perform better in an
inflationary environment.
5. Replacing U-shaped marginal tax rate schedules with a uniform
rate would likely reduce marginal tax rates at both ends of the
income distribution. In turn, this would alleviate both the
poverty trap problem and the waste of resources used by high-
income individuals to avoid taxes.
The over-all redistributive and efficiency effects of this
reform remain an empirical question. Since they depend in part on
the existing tax-transfer system, a similar reform would have different
effects across provinces. Moreover, the effects depend crucially on
the choice of the marginal tax rate retained. Assuming no increase
in deficits, this rate would have to be fixed at a level allowing the
government to finance its expenditure in public goods and transfers,
net of its other sources of income and net of the initial deficit.
Therefore the effect of the reform on work incentives is not
clear: while it induces the welfare recipient to return to work, it
could introduce work disincentives, both for those working poor who
would become eligible for transfer payments, and possibly for
average-income workers who would likely face a higher marginal tax
rate.
We must therefore rely on a simulation model to assess the
effects of such a reform. The model should take into account the
behavioural responses of individuals and firms in order to evaluate
the impact of the reform on the level of economic activity (that is,
the efficiency gains). In principle, if production and income were
raised to a sufficient level, the increase in tax revenues could even
be used to reduce the income tax rate for all persons.
Preliminary results from a model simulation constructed by
Rousseau and me5 show that a fiat-rate reform providing the same
5 Fortin & Rousseau, supra, note 3.
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guaranteed levels of income as in the pre-reform situation and
applied to Quebec for 1980 would, in the long run, reduce
substantially, that is by more than 40 percent, the inefficiency costs
due to work disincentives associated with the current tax-transfer
system; GNP would increase by 7 percent and employment by 5
percent. Because of this enhanced competitiveness in Quebec's
economy, the capital stock would increase by 8 percent.
The effective marginal income tax rate would, on average, be
reduced by 10 percentage points, but for some individuals it would
actually increase. All these figures should, of course, be taken as
rough estimates and not as precise results.
While the reform offers clear advantages at the aggregate
level, they are not equally distributed across the population. There
are winners and losers. In particular, many households in the third
and fourth lower quintiles of income would suffer a welfare loss.
Moreover, aggregate measures of inequality indicated an
unambiguous increase in welfare inequality across the population.
The rich would gain more than the poor.
Whether such a reform should be implemented depends
again on value judgments concerning the optimal trade-off between
equity and efficiency. However, I personally doubt that it would be
politically acceptable. In a democracy where governments are
elected by majority rule, the median voter's preferences are often
critical in government decisions. In this reform, the median voter
is likely to suffer a welfare reduction, at least in the short run and
probably also in the long run.
This analysis should not only be interpreted as a simple
exercise. Because of its simplicity and its far-reaching implications,
flat-rate NIT reform is a useful benchmark for comparing other, more
complex alternative reforms, such as a NIT with two or more rates,
or categorical systems like comprehensive two-tier programs or
"workfare" proposals.
Moreover, it helps to understand why most broad-ranging,
sweeping reforms that have many advantages in terms of efficiency
and simplicity are never implemented. Similar arguments could
probably explain why the reforms proposed by the Carter
Commission were rejected.
In a sense, once the basic parameters of the over-all tax-
transfer system (mainly the categories of households eligible, the
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guaranteed minimum income levels, the tax bases, and the effective
marginal tax rates) are determined, the question of how to integrate
the various system components to obtain the desired parameter
levels is essentially a technical one. Indeed, there is a large variety
of approaches that would yield equivalent integrated systems in terms
of these parameters. Of course, one should not underestimate the
complexity of this technical question. In particular, it may involve
close co-ordination between federal and provincial levels of
jurisdiction.
In fact, the integration problem arose in large part from a
lack of political willingness, at least until recently, to look at the tax-
transfer system from an over-all perspective. This is exemplified by
the fact that government publications on marginal tax rarely
encompass implicit marginal rates of transfer programs. For
example, the Macdonald Report has been criticized by many
observers (including Kesselman 6) for having failed to integrate its
Universal Income Security Program and the current income tax
system. As a result, the system proposed involved effective marginal
tax rates in the 50 to 60 percent range for families in the $10,000
to $40,000 range.
This question of integration should not mask the more
fundamental question of determining parameters for an over-all
system. This more basic question depends on value judgments, as
we have illustrated with the case of the flat-rate NIT, and on the
trade-off between income distribution and economic efficiency. The
over-all approach to the tax transfer system was clearly the approach
retained in the Quebec White Paper. In Quebec there is evidence
of a clear political willingness for a reform, including both the
positive and the negative segments of the system. In fact, some
elements of reform on the positive side of the system have been
implemented since the publication of the White Paper. Reforms on
the negative side are expected soon.
The pressure for comprehensive tax-transfer reform seems to
be more accentuated in Quebec than elsewhere. Perhaps this is due
to the relatively advanced nature of Quebec's welfare state and to
6 J.R. Kesselman, "The Royal Commission's Proposals for Income Security Reform" (1986)
12 Can. Pub. PoI'y 101.
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its pronounced lack of integration. The question of whether the
Quebec approach will snowball in the other provinces and at the
federal level must, however, remain open.
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